N-person game theory provides a logical framework for analyzing contests in which there are more than two players or sets of conflicting interests-anything from a hand of poker to the tangled web of international relations. In this sequel to his Two-Person Game Theory, Dr. Rapoport provides a fascinating and lucid introduction to the theory, geared towards readers with little mathematical background but with an appetite for rigorous analysis. Following an introduction to the necessary mathematical notation (mainly set theory), in Part I the author presents basic concepts an... Read More
N-person game theory provides a logical framework for analyzing contests in which there are more than two players or sets of conflicting interests-anything from a hand of poker to the tangled web of international relations. In this sequel to his Two-Person Game Theory, Dr. Rapoport provides a fascinating and lucid introduction to the theory, geared towards readers with little mathematical background but with an appetite for rigorous analysis. Following an introduction to the necessary mathematical notation (mainly set theory), in Part I the author presents basic concepts an... Read More
Description
N-person game theory provides a logical framework for analyzing contests in which there are more than two players or sets of conflicting interests-anything from a hand of poker to the tangled web of international relations. In this sequel to his Two-Person Game Theory, Dr. Rapoport provides a fascinating and lucid introduction to the theory, geared towards readers with little mathematical background but with an appetite for rigorous analysis. Following an introduction to the necessary mathematical notation (mainly set theory), in Part I the author presents basic concepts and models, including levels of game-theoretic analysis, individual and group rationality, the Von Neumann-Morgenstern solution, the Shapley value, the bargaining set, the kernel, restrictions on realignments, games in partition function form, and Harsanyi's bargaining model. In Part II he delves into the theory's social applications, including small markets, large markets, simple games and legislatures, symmetric and quota games, coalitions and power, and more. This affordable new edition will be welcomed by economists, political scientists, historians, and anyone interested in multilateral negotiations or conflicts, as well as by general readers with an interest in mathematics, logic, or games.
Reprint of the The University of Michigan Press, 1970 edition.
Details
Price: $22.95
Pages: 334
Publisher: Dover Publications
Imprint: Dover Publications
Series: Dover Books on Mathematics
Publication Date: 20th March 2013
Trim Size: 5.37 x 8.5 in
ISBN: 9780486414553
Format: Paperback
BISACs: MATHEMATICS / Game Theory
Author Bio
Russian-born Anatol Rapoport (1911-2007) was an American mathematician and psychologist who contributed to general systems theory, mathematical biology, and the mathematical modeling of social interaction and stochastic models of contagion. He combined his mathematical expertise with psychological insights into the study of game theory, social networks, and semantics.
Table of Contents
Introduction: Some Mathematical Tools Part I. Basic Concepts 1. Levels of Game-theoretic Analysis 2. Three-level Analysis of Elementary Games 3. Individual and Group Rationality 4. The Von Neumann-Morgenstern Solution 5. The Shapely Value 6. The Bargaining Set 7. The Kernel 8. Restrictions on Realignments 9. Games in Partition Function Form 10. N-Person Theory and Two-Person Theory Compared 11. Harsanyi's Bargaining Model Part II. Applications Introduction to Part II 12. A Small Market 13. Large Markets 14. Simple Games and Legislatures 15. Symmetric and Quota Games 16. Coalitions and Power 17. Experimetns Suggested by N-Person Game Theory 18. "So Long Sucker" : A Do-it-yourself Experiment" 19. The Behavorial Scientist's View 20. Concluding Remarks Notes References Index
N-person game theory provides a logical framework for analyzing contests in which there are more than two players or sets of conflicting interests-anything from a hand of poker to the tangled web of international relations. In this sequel to his Two-Person Game Theory, Dr. Rapoport provides a fascinating and lucid introduction to the theory, geared towards readers with little mathematical background but with an appetite for rigorous analysis. Following an introduction to the necessary mathematical notation (mainly set theory), in Part I the author presents basic concepts and models, including levels of game-theoretic analysis, individual and group rationality, the Von Neumann-Morgenstern solution, the Shapley value, the bargaining set, the kernel, restrictions on realignments, games in partition function form, and Harsanyi's bargaining model. In Part II he delves into the theory's social applications, including small markets, large markets, simple games and legislatures, symmetric and quota games, coalitions and power, and more. This affordable new edition will be welcomed by economists, political scientists, historians, and anyone interested in multilateral negotiations or conflicts, as well as by general readers with an interest in mathematics, logic, or games.
Reprint of the The University of Michigan Press, 1970 edition.
Price: $22.95
Pages: 334
Publisher: Dover Publications
Imprint: Dover Publications
Series: Dover Books on Mathematics
Publication Date: 20th March 2013
Trim Size: 5.37 x 8.5 in
ISBN: 9780486414553
Format: Paperback
BISACs: MATHEMATICS / Game Theory
Russian-born Anatol Rapoport (1911-2007) was an American mathematician and psychologist who contributed to general systems theory, mathematical biology, and the mathematical modeling of social interaction and stochastic models of contagion. He combined his mathematical expertise with psychological insights into the study of game theory, social networks, and semantics.
Introduction: Some Mathematical Tools Part I. Basic Concepts 1. Levels of Game-theoretic Analysis 2. Three-level Analysis of Elementary Games 3. Individual and Group Rationality 4. The Von Neumann-Morgenstern Solution 5. The Shapely Value 6. The Bargaining Set 7. The Kernel 8. Restrictions on Realignments 9. Games in Partition Function Form 10. N-Person Theory and Two-Person Theory Compared 11. Harsanyi's Bargaining Model Part II. Applications Introduction to Part II 12. A Small Market 13. Large Markets 14. Simple Games and Legislatures 15. Symmetric and Quota Games 16. Coalitions and Power 17. Experimetns Suggested by N-Person Game Theory 18. "So Long Sucker" : A Do-it-yourself Experiment" 19. The Behavorial Scientist's View 20. Concluding Remarks Notes References Index